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The paper traces the particular quality of human existence as linguistic embodied 
existence. In asking whether language is like body, it spells out what linguistic 
experience entails and what kind of picture results from this analysis as grounding 
the “person” (following Gallagher & Zahavi’s definition) in space/time/body and 
language. Understanding linguistic existence as embodied existence also facilitates an 
argument against a representationalist view of language. Nietzsche’s concern is taken 
up and analyzed: Does the self-reflexivity resulting from linguistic experience threaten 
individuality? Against his pessimistic conclusion, the article suggests to see language as 
enabling the individual agent-self. 
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In the following paper I would like to contribute to the discussion of 
contemporary phenomenology by presenting some thoughts on linguistic 
existence as experienced existence. In particular, I want to address the 
question whether existence in language is embodied existence. As creatures 
of language, we are constituted, surrounded and limited in our existence by 
language. Is language then like body? 
I will propose and discuss the thesis that both our embodied and linguistic 
nature enables a specific form of experienced self. First, I give in brief 
the premises and definitions of the terms I am using. I review what the 
embodiment argument argues, critically examine it and spell out what 
experience of and experience in language entails. Next, I pursue some 
phenomenological and logical implications of my thesis, some differences 
and some similarities of language and body. Then I briefly address Nietzsche’s 
worry that the ability of self-reflection is merely an effect of the herd and 
that it threatens the strong, autonomous individual. Finally, I close with some 
remarks on methodological individualism1. 
What Self are we talking about? 
For the purposes of making sense of the self, there are different levels of self 
to be distinguished and these are referred to differently in different analyses. 
There is one sense of the social self which can be found quite independently 
of a linguistic structure, for example in hierarchical social structures of ape-
groups (DeWaal 1982). There is another sense of the social self by which the 
self is constituted through intentional agency (Korsgaard 2009). In contrast 
to these notions, what I have in mind and what I would like to investigate is a 
sense of self that intentional agency presupposes. 
I am here concerned with the negotiation between the pre-intentional 
experience of self and the experience of the narration of self (as they are 
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1.
General Terms 
and Conditions
1 This article was first presented as an introduction to a discussion at the Milano Winter 
School of 2010 that was very fruitful and I thank all the participants for their comments. 
The material is part of an ongoing research project entitled “The Leap into Language - The 
Constitution of the Social Self between pre-intentional Background and self-reflexive Cogito” 
and will function as position paper for this project. I thought it best to retain the broad strokes 
of the argument to give an overview over some of the basic positions and main theses I am 
pursuing with this project. This article has been completed with the support of the DAAD in 
cooperation with the Maison de Sciences de l’Homme. I thank both institutions for a research 
stipend in Paris that made my work possible. 
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relevant for individual intentional agency). Gallagher and Zahavi suggest 
calling this aspect of the self “person” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008). The 
perceptions of self-experience and self-narration align with the distinction 
between the first-person perspective of experience and the mediation of this 
experience in language according to which the linguistic realm is the realm of 
third person accessible descriptions, the publicly shared realm of language2. 
Language/Body as Medium
There is an understanding of language, body and self whereby language and 
body are media giving the self access to the world. According to this view, the 
world is always mediated through sense-perceptions and the sensible ordering 
of propositional or quasi-linguistic categories that allow us to understand our 
perceptions as apperceptions3. I believe this view falls prey to a homunculus 
fallacy. It is easy to see this fallacy first with regard to the body: 
It is clearly wrong to think that there is a kind of “tiny person” inside the body, 
steering this body and being responsible for organizing the perceptions of the 
body, rendering them meaningful. The body is not the medium of the tiny self, 
for her expressions or conations. What we describe while describing a “self” is 
according to Hume not an extra-entity (Hume 2007). Yet, even though Hume 
is right in that there is no discrete experience of the self as entity, the self is 
present in all other experiences. Most minimally it describes a unified field of 
consciousness. One could say that being a rational agent is like having a distinct 
perspective. Several perspectives are available to describe different levels of 
self. The capacity to reason and a net of recognition cast over past experiences 
and future aspirations are added to the “perspectival self” to enable agency 
in the full sense of the word. Most animals and humans share at least the 
perspective of self as embodied unity capable of consciousness and intentional 
actions. Humans are capable of the additional perspective of rational agency 
that ties their experiences and enables their specific forms of action. So, 
body, like language, is not analogous to a medium for an agent-self, but rather 
constitutes a perspective available to the agent. 
Rejecting the “body/language as medium”-analogy on grounds of the 
homunculus fallacy forms the blueprint for an argument against a 
representationalist view of language and an argument for a pragmatic 
semantics. A pragmatic semantics allows us to see language not as an image 
or a representation of the world inside the head of the speaker. There is no 
2 My position sets itself apart from Sartre’s distinction of en-soi and pour-soi that 
describes different modes of the first person perspective from the third person point of 
view; see Sartre.
3 For a critique of this view see also Burge 2010.
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tiny person “in the head” receiving perceptions of the world as linguistic 
representations and constructing an image of the world from these 
instructions. A pragmatic semantics sees language as a way of acting in the 
world (Grice 1989; Meggle 1997; Kobow 2009). It is a way of acting in the world 
of meaning that we share and constitute with others. 
Embodied linguistic experience is not like having a map of noun-phrase type 
affordances (bees)4, it creates not just a social space of relations and group 
hierarchies (primates), but delivers us into a world constructed and shaped 
by deontic relations. 
Where is Descartes? (or rather: where he is not)
I take the embodiment argument to have originated as a critique of Cartesian 
Dualism. It is true that Descartes is looking from nowhere when he states that 
the structure of thinking/doubting is the least and last certainty, failing to 
see that there can be no thoughts from nowhere, but instead that the thought 
always brings with it coordinates of time and place, of body and of language. 
I leave aside the question whether thought can only be linguistically 
structured. Let me stress that most categories of perception, agency and 
understanding depend upon the existence in a world of deontic relations, 
created collectively with others, which is constituted linguistically. It is not 
that thought has to be linguistic in its form, but rather that the structure of 
contingency (whether linguistic or corporal) gives actual shape (content) to 
the empty capacity for thought as background-given.
The embodiment-debate considers different kinds of intentionality. Dreyfus 
claims that there is motor versus brain intentionality. He cites the example of 
playing tennis or piano, and he emphasizes the importance of corporeal skills 
and memories as constitutive of a special kind of intentionality, one that is not 
in one’s brain, but instead in one’s body. I take it to be an idle question though to 
ask what “organ” stimulated which response. Ultimately, the real problem is not 
where intentionality originated, but how we can conceptually overcome Cartesian 
Dualism. That is: how can we theoretically bridge the gap between body and mind? 
There is a related dualism manifest in the schism between first person experiences 
and mediation of these experiences in language. If the dualism body/mind is 
confined to the individual, the dualism experience/language broadens the view for 
an analysis of the connection between the individual and the world of others. 
What does “linguistic” experience and existence entail? 
Sometimes language is considered to be the default, or the most basic, or the 
2.
The embodiment 
argument 
revisited & what 
language entails 
4 Tyler Burge detailed this position (based on his 2010 publication) in the Jean-Nicod 
Lectures 2010 in Paris. 
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most primordial means for translating experiences into the realm of the shared, 
the narrated, the described. Two questions arise: 
Are experiences describable? 
This question points towards the general question of translatability. A tentative 
“yes” could be the answer if one considers that “translation” or “paraphrase” 
never encompasses the notion sameness, but rather difference. “Losing” or 
“gaining” in translation means just that. Beholding a translation then describes 
a process that is different from the experience of the original or the original 
experience, but is in itself to be experienced (as translation, and as new original 
experience). Translations can be understood analogously to communicative 
attempts. Understanding signs as non-naturally meaningful, as communicatively 
meaningfully ordered, is the foundation for cultural cognition, the basis of 
pooling knowledge in a community and transmitting it from individual to 
individual (Tomasello 1999). 
What is the experience of language? 
Language is to be experienced in itself; it is part of our cultural background: that 
is, the pre-intentional realm where our biological capacities, inclinations, abilities 
are spelled out culturally; for example, the ability to learn a language is occupied 
by a mother tongue. The occurrence of cultural specification is arbitrary. Yet, it is 
experienced as naturalized. The experience of language is naturalized in this way. 
Thus, we are embodied in a body and in a language necessarily, but at the same 
time contingently. Our language is not a biological given (though our capacity 
to learn a language is), but culturally shaped. That is, in being linguistically 
embodied, we are necessarily linked to the cultural world surrounding us. We 
are also bound to accept the phenomenological and logical entailments of this 
linguistic existence: 
Body - Contingency - Language 
The phenomenological implications of my thesis that our embodied and linguistic 
nature enables a sense of self facilitate a re-structuring of the different components 
of the self in relation to world and others. Here is the new picture: the body 
delineates the individual, it enables an experience of ownership and agency via 
the experience of bodily movement in a space perceived as external; contingency 
carries the coordinates of place and time where place and body are not the same; 
body affords experiencing the core-self, place grounds this experience as taking 
place in an external reality; time is largely a category shaped through collectively 
structured facts – we have an understanding of time because we are agents and we 
are always acting in the world as culturally constituted world (rarely with brute 
force in brute reality); language is the component that grants us access to this 
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implications 
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largest part of reality that we shape with others, that makes up our world. 
Let me lastly remark on the fact that the term “self” in a language-philosophical 
analysis always shows up as a term indicating a relation. That something can be 
described as “self” is due to the fact that there are “others”; this relates not only 
to the bodily self in a space that is perceived as external, it relates also to “self” as 
opposed to other consciousness with which reality has to be negotiated and shared. 
Indexicality - Generality - Strong Altruism 
Another logical entailment of linguistic structure is the understanding of 
indexicality, generality and strong (non-moral) altruism. I follow Searle in 
his analysis of the consequence of the indexicality of statements concerning 
my-self (Searle 2001). It is much like Nietzsche predicts: the need to self-
ascribe and self-describe comes from my need to communicate and leads 
to recognition of “the herd” (Nietzsche 1990). This, in turn, leads to the 
abstraction and grasping of the concept of linguistic generality (what goes 
for me also goes for you), and lastly results in a logical requirement of strong 
altruism. It is not only a thing of preference or fairness to see that I and 
you alike should be bound by the truth-requirement of statements, but it is 
instead a logical and thereby theoretical syllogism that binds me to this truth-
requirement; and this is due to the fact that I as an agent-self am constituted 
via participation in collectively constituted facts (Searle 2009). 
Thus, the phenomenological and logical implications of language-shaped 
existence come to mind when one considers the role of self-reflection. 
Recognizing these implications is, in a way, of no consequence since it does not 
change our ontological make-up. In this way, I think Pascal’s dictum of customs 
being our nature does not, as frequently assumed, indicate that we have no 
nature (and are therefore free to chose), but instead that we are essentially, 
ontologically linked to the historical givens of our existence. It remains to be 
seen whether and how self-reflexivity plays a real role in our actions. 
What does it mean to be able to understand the indexicality of “me” as 
abstraction with the consequence that “me” can be the same for you, pointing 
to the ownership and agency of bodily experiences, leading to a structural 
understanding of self and of linguistic generality that entails the logical 
necessity of strong altruism? This is Nietzsche’s worry: 
What is Nietzsche worried about?
Nietzsche is worried about becoming self-conscious because he sees it as a direct 
consequence of our biological nature as gregarious animals (Nietzsche 1990). 
Interestingly, he analyses self-consciousness as resulting from our need to 
communicate. This in turn results from our weakness as individual beings who need the 
help and assistance of the herd to survive. Nietzsche would have much preferred the 
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Nietzsche’s 
worry about 
becoming 
self-conscious 
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individual to be the solitary beast of prey. He sees human autonomy and intellectual 
freedom threatened by the communicative, the non-individual, the conventional sign. 
(Logical) Problems inherent in the analysis
There is, of course, as Nietzsche himself is aware, a logical problem with 
his position. He argues against the foundations of his own writing. He 
himself is only and necessarily the result of the hated herd, his own writing 
is incessantly self-referential and self-analytical. The language that he 
uses like the great soloist his instrument is only the result of the need for 
communication and so refined because of the necessity and utility of “truth” 
and “introspection” for the herd. Nietzsche maintains that the translation 
into the third person perspective of language threatens the ipseity and 
singular genius of individual experience. 
Taking his analysis seriously (Getting rid of self consciousness) 
Generally, I agree with Nietzsche’s analysis. Yet, I think that his conclusion 
is flawed because he insists on an evaluation of the analysis of language and 
self-consciousness as threatening the individual. Where Nietzsche begins 
paragraph 354 on a hopeful note, stating that we are now in a position to shed 
self-consciousness as we understand its origin, he lets go of this threat and by 
the end of the text anticipates the downfall of mankind due to its inability to 
see beyond the “herd” and its biological utilitarianism. That we should need 
the others is the biggest insult for Nietzsche. 
Vs. Nietzsche: Existence in Language as Enabling 
Nietzsche evidently regards the translation of experience into language as 
a second order phenomenon, one that is necessitated and effected by our 
need for others and for communication. And he laments this generalization 
as making something unique flat, general and dull. But of course one can 
also understand the making describable of experiences as an enabling 
process. Nietzsche would have to agree that we cannot be who we are 
without introspection, recognition of our ontological make-up and without 
language, without others, without communication and without self-
consciousness.  
The solitary beast of prey never developed a language and a system of 
collectively constituted meanings, nor did most gregarious animals. That 
we are who we are is biologically motivated, it is due to our creature-nature 
and it is also necessarily determined by our existence in a contingent 
circumstance. All of these facts are given. I suggest seeing them as enabling 
rather than disabling for their interpretation is, like the interpretation of 
all facts, entirely up to us. 
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Worth the trouble? Keeping Methodological Individualism as Premise 
In my research, I am analyzing texts that have the premise of Methodological 
Individualism as a common denominator and a starting point. I think that the 
Cartesian tradition delivers us to this premise. But why bother? 
Methodological Individualism can be understood as the position that all 
agency, including collective endeavors and group actions, bottoms out in 
individual mental states; that there is nothing but individual mental states 
that constitute and motivate individuals, groups and their actions5. 
I suggest abiding by Methodological Individualism because it is necessary for 
obtaining “meaningful” coherence with the analysis of data (for example, data 
from the neurosciences): it is only at this level of explanation that “meaning” can 
enter the picture. Meaning links the individual’s perceived values and motivating 
desire-independent reasons to the world of deontic relations that it constitutes 
with others, a world that enables most (if not all) agency in the full sense for the 
individual. Methodological Individualism is theoretically necessary to explain the 
constitutive power of linguistic structure for the individual. In this respect my 
insistence both on Methodological Individualism and on the analysis of linguistic 
structure is formally much like the justification of doing phenomenology for the 
philosophy of mind. Both times a level of explanation is added that is deemed 
irreplaceable for a coherent understanding of the phenomenon. If language is as 
body constitutive of the experienced self, Methodological individualism indicates 
how an experience of self is important for any notion of agency. 
Evaluation of Results
I hope to have demonstrated that an analysis of language analogous to body 
not only 
- leads to a clearer differentiation of the make-up of the self as logically 
implying the self’s interest in the world of the others as necessity, and 
- leads to an understanding of the self as being individuated through a 
body, manifested at a time-place, and constituted through language. 
I hope to have also outlined how understanding linguistic existence as 
embodied enables us 
- to see the homunculus fallacy in the representationalist view of language, 
- to question the primacy of experience (as opposed to narration of self) 
not only on the level of epistemic facts, but rather on a theoretical level 
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Concluding 
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methodological 
individualism 
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results 
5 Some problems arise with explaining unintended fall-out consequences, non-agentive functions 
of collectively constituted facts (such as, for example, systemic discrimination, inflation or man-
made natural disasters). Another problem is the analysis of group-think, that is, group-wants 
that are contrary to each of the group members’ individual preferences, where agents behave 
and argue differently (giving explanations of their behavior and arriving at decisions to act) 
because they “think on behalf” of their group. I think both of these problems can be overcome.
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where it concerns the self as agent-self, and 
- to reread Nietzsche’s pessimistic conclusion in a positive way where 
language (and consciousness through language) is an enabling structure 
for the agent-self. 
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